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Green	  Devaluation:	  Disruption,	  Divestment,	  and	  Decommodification	  for	  a	  
Green	  Economy	  	  








This	  paper	  argues	  that	  taking	  up	  questions	  of	  value	  can	  help	  political	  ecologists	  and	  
economists	  develop	  a	  more	  powerful	  analysis	  of	  the	  green	  economy,	  as	  it	  introduces	  new	  
urban,	  industrial,	  and	  technological	  dimensions	  into	  a	  self-­‐identified	  green	  capitalism.	  More	  
specifically,	  I	  maintain	  that	  processes	  of	  green	  devaluation,	  decommodification,	  and	  techno-­‐
industrial	  replacement	  are	  as	  important	  in	  understanding	  green	  economic	  development	  as	  
new	  value	  enclosure	  and	  green	  growth.	  Twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  green	  economic	  politics	  have	  
been	  marked	  by	  Schumpeterian	  ambitions	  and	  zero-­‐sum	  intra-­‐capitalist	  struggles,	  alongside	  
a	  more	  general	  hardening	  of	  anti-­‐fossil	  fuel	  industry	  politics	  from	  both	  grassroots	  climate	  
justice	  activists	  and,	  increasingly,	  mainstream	  investors.	  I	  explore	  three	  interrelated	  
initiatives—disruptive	  innovation	  in	  Silicon	  Valley	  cleantech,	  the	  US	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  
movement,	  and	  the	  global	  financial	  industry’s	  stranded	  assets	  organizing—as	  windows	  into	  
these	  struggles.	  Themes	  of	  devaluation,	  obsolescence	  (both	  technological	  and	  “moral”),	  and	  
(more	  or	  less	  absolute)	  decommodification	  carry	  through	  this	  discussion	  as	  activists	  struggle	  
to	  translate	  quantitative	  advances	  against	  fossil	  fuels	  into	  a	  more	  profound	  qualitative	  break.	  
Understanding	  these	  fights	  is	  essential	  to	  developing	  more	  effective	  engaged	  scholarship	  on	  
climate	  change	  and	  a	  just	  energy	  transition.	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  fuel	  divestment;	  green	  economy;	  decommodification;	  
obsolescence	  
	  
The	  economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  2000s	  provoked	  a	  major	  shift	  within	  neoliberal	  capitalism	  
and,	  centrally,	  neoliberal	  environmentalism.	  Alongside	  its	  unleashing	  of	  global	  finance	  and	  
attacks	  on	  Keynesian	  and	  Developmentalist	  welfare	  states,	  neoliberalism	  had	  pioneered	  new	  
forms	  of	  accumulation	  by	  dispossession	  at	  the	  periphery;	  notably,	  “green”	  value	  enclosures	  
and	  land/resource	  grabs.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  2008	  collapse	  demonstrated	  to	  many	  the	  
neoliberal	  turn’s	  failure	  to	  secure	  capitalism.	  As	  more	  radical	  voices	  called	  for	  breaks	  from	  a	  
system	  in	  crisis,	  heterodox	  economists	  fought	  back	  from	  the	  margins	  to	  gain	  the	  ear	  of	  
powerful	  governments.	  The	  American	  Recovery	  and	  Reinvestment	  Act	  and	  other	  national	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recovery	  programs	  adopted	  neo-­‐Keynesian	  rhetoric,	  advocating	  technological	  rejuvenation,	  
the	  creation	  of	  quality	  manufacturing	  jobs,	  and	  a	  return	  to	  “real”	  economic	  development.	  
Critically,	  many	  looked	  to	  a	  “green	  economy”	  as	  the	  driver	  of	  this	  economic	  transformation	  
(Block	  2011;	  UNEP	  2011;	  Bailey	  and	  Caprotti	  2014).	  Green	  economic	  development	  programs	  
reframed	  neoliberalism’s	  environmental	  project	  as	  industrial	  and	  innovation	  policy—the	  
dream	  of	  ecological	  modernization	  (Mol	  and	  Spaargaaren	  2000)	  prioritized	  and	  funded	  to	  an	  
unprecedented	  degree	  in	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China.	  Programs	  pledged	  
support	  for	  rising	  “cleantech”	  industries,	  particularly	  ones	  developing	  renewable	  and	  
alternative	  energy.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  by	  moving	  to	  wean	  their	  economies	  off	  fossil	  fuels,	  
they	  sought	  to	  mitigate	  the	  longer-­‐term	  crisis	  of	  climate	  change.	  
Critical	  environmental	  scholarship	  has	  confronted	  so-­‐called	  green	  capitalism	  in	  many	  
forms,	  but	  it	  has	  only	  begun	  to	  take	  on	  the	  green	  economy.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  one	  of	  
the	  green	  economy’s	  most	  important	  effects	  has	  been	  to	  move	  creative	  destruction	  
(Schumpeter	  [1934]	  2011,	  [1942]	  2008),	  and	  a	  more	  aggressive,	  zero-­‐sum	  conception	  of	  
green	  growth,	  to	  the	  center	  of	  green	  capitalist	  politics.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  Green	  
Keynesianism	  has	  been	  disappointed	  in	  many	  ways	  by	  neoliberalism’s	  enduring	  power—
ongoing	  financial	  short-­‐termism,	  pressure	  to	  offshore	  manufacturing,	  and	  working/middle-­‐
class	  economic	  precarity	  have	  so	  far	  checked	  many	  green	  jobs	  hopes.	  However,	  green	  
Schumpeterianism	  is	  alive	  and	  well.	  Prominent	  neo-­‐Schumpeterian	  economists	  and	  
innovation	  theorists	  (Mazzucato	  2013;	  Perez	  2013)	  continue	  to	  interpret	  the	  green	  economy	  
for	  academic	  and	  popular	  audiences,	  for	  example	  through	  notions	  of	  socio-­‐technical/energy	  
transition	  and	  transformation.	  Critically,	  narratives	  of	  “disruptive	  innovation,”	  zero-­‐sum	  
technological	  and	  industrial	  competition,	  pervade	  green	  capitalism’s	  new	  high-­‐tech	  spaces.	  
Alternative	  energy	  enterprises	  aim	  to	  disrupt	  the	  existing	  energy	  industry,	  overturning	  
established	  technologies,	  organizational	  forms,	  and	  companies	  (and	  production	  regions	  and	  
geographies	  of	  capital).	  More	  recently	  climate	  justice	  activism	  tacitly	  enlisted	  itself	  behind	  
this	  intra-­‐capitalist	  struggle,	  as	  entities	  such	  as	  350.org	  wage	  a	  major	  campaign	  to	  pressure	  
endowments,	  pension	  funds,	  and	  other	  institutional	  investors	  to	  financially	  divest	  from	  fossil	  
fuel	  companies,	  with	  or	  without	  reinvestment	  in	  their	  green	  competitors.	  Fossil	  fuel	  
companies	  have	  proven	  a	  difficult	  target	  for	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  would-­‐be	  disruptors.	  However,	  
financial	  players	  are	  increasingly	  compelling	  the	  energy	  industry	  to	  prepare	  against	  enforced	  
technological	  replacement,	  as	  they	  quantify	  and	  publicize	  the	  epochal	  financial	  risks	  of	  
“stranded	  assets”—a	  multi-­‐trillion	  dollar	  devaluation	  of	  fossil	  resource	  reserves,	  and	  a	  global	  
geography	  of	  property	  rendered	  unusable.	  	  
With	  other	  papers	  in	  this	  collection,	  I	  emphasize	  value	  theory’s	  ongoing	  power	  to	  
shed	  light	  on	  the	  workings	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  green	  capitalism	  specifically.	  Here,	  I	  focus	  on	  
the	  aforementioned	  strategic	  devaluations	  being	  waged	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  green	  economy.	  I	  
explore	  what	  I	  call	  “green	  devaluation”	  via	  projects	  of	  disruptive	  innovation,	  divestment,	  and	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asset	  stranding,	  framing	  them	  as	  an	  interrelated	  set	  of	  politics.	  Methodologically,	  I	  analyze	  
cleantech	  discourses	  developing	  among	  venture	  capitalists	  and	  tech	  industry	  analysts,	  
organizing	  visions	  articulated	  by	  the	  divestment	  movement,	  and	  stranded	  asset	  assessments	  
released	  by	  investors	  and	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative	  and	  Oxford’s	  
Stranded	  Assets	  Research	  Network.	  Interpreting	  these	  interconnected	  discourses	  and	  
practices,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  green	  economy’s	  devaluations	  encompass	  far	  more	  than	  simple	  
competition	  for	  customers,	  with	  seesawing	  revaluations	  as	  opposing	  companies	  and	  energy	  
sources	  gain	  and	  lose	  market	  share.	  Instead,	  they	  suggest	  a	  more	  absolute,	  structural	  
devaluation	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  assets	  and	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  as	  we	  know	  them—one	  perhaps	  
best	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  technological	  and	  “moral”	  obsolescence,	  and,	  ultimately,	  
decommodification.	  This	  decommodification	  is	  an	  understudied	  but	  increasingly	  significant	  
corollary	  of	  more	  familiar	  processes	  of	  green	  enclosure.	  
	  
Theorizing	  Green	  Value	  and	  Devaluation	  
Critical	  environmental	  scholars	  are	  increasingly	  taking	  up	  questions	  of	  value	  in	  their	  
examinations	  of	  the	  formation	  and	  failings	  of	  new	  environmental	  markets.	  These	  markets,	  
and	  their	  commodities	  and	  value	  forms,	  are	  based	  on	  previously	  non-­‐marketed	  “ecosystem	  
services,”	  pollution	  (or,	  rather,	  pollution-­‐prevented/mitigated),	  and	  other	  environmental	  
“externalities”	  and	  pro-­‐environmental	  actions	  traditionally	  ignored	  by	  economics	  and	  
business	  practice.	  Critiques	  have	  analyzed	  emerging	  mainstream	  processes	  of	  green	  
commodification	  theoretically	  and	  historically,	  from	  utilitarian	  framings	  of	  biophysical	  
processes	  (the	  creation	  of	  novel	  use	  values)	  to	  formal	  assignment	  of	  exchange	  values,	  their	  
appropriation,	  and	  market	  creation	  (e.g.	  Foster	  2002;	  Castree	  2003;	  Heynen	  et	  al.	  2007;	  
Mansfield	  2009;	  Prudham	  2009;	  Gómez-­‐Baggethun	  et	  al.	  2010).	  However,	  investigations	  of	  
green	  markets	  have	  engaged	  more	  extensively	  with	  particular	  valuation	  attempts	  and	  their	  
failings/failures	  (often	  following	  Polanyi	  [1944]	  2001)	  than	  with	  the	  broader	  systemic	  role	  
that	  green	  enclosure	  might	  play	  in	  the	  expanded	  reproduction	  of	  capital	  and	  capitalism;	  for	  
example,	  questions	  of	  surplus	  value	  production	  and	  appropriation.	  Existing	  research	  most	  
often	  discusses	  surplus	  value	  as	  stolen	  from	  various	  “outsides”	  in	  processes	  of	  accumulation	  
by	  dispossession	  (e.g.	  Harvey	  2003;	  Moore	  2015).	  However,	  the	  green	  economy’s	  move	  into	  
urban	  and	  industrial	  geographies	  prompts	  us	  to	  consider	  more	  expansive	  analyses	  of	  value,	  
surplus	  value,	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  (green)	  capitalism.	  
Emerging	  attempts	  to	  theorize	  the	  green	  economy	  are	  beginning	  to	  engage	  familiar	  
processes	  in	  geographical	  political	  economy	  (e.g.	  Harvey	  1982;	  Storper	  and	  Walker	  1989;	  
Sheppard	  2011):	  high-­‐tech	  struggles;	  industrial	  formation,	  competition,	  and	  decline;	  urban-­‐
regional	  investment	  and	  disinvestment.	  In	  value	  terms,	  the	  green	  economy’s	  move	  into	  
urban	  and	  industrial	  geographies	  suggests	  additional	  sources	  of	  surplus	  value,	  including	  
labor	  exploitation	  in	  the	  classic	  Marxian	  sense	  (Marx	  [1867]	  1990)	  and	  urban	  and	  rural	  land	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rents	  (Knuth	  2016;	  Smith	  2007).	  Of	  particular	  interest	  here,	  “technological”	  (or	  
“Schumpeterian”)	  rents	  are	  often	  framed	  as	  a	  more	  virtuous	  form	  of	  surplus.	  The	  concept	  
describes	  the	  more	  or	  less	  transient	  monopoly	  (and	  monopoly	  rents)	  that	  innovators	  can	  
command	  before	  a	  technological	  breakthrough	  is	  generalized	  (Storper	  and	  Walker	  1989).	  
Technological	  rents	  are	  particularly	  applicable	  where,	  as	  with	  the	  green	  economy,	  innovators	  
aim	  at	  a	  major	  intensive	  expansion	  and	  secular	  transformation	  within	  capitalism,	  not	  simply	  
extension	  of	  the	  existing	  system	  at	  its	  peripheries.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  would-­‐be	  industrial	  
revolution,	  enterprises	  produce	  novel	  value	  frontiers	  in	  addition	  to	  merely	  enclosing	  them,	  
creating	  dramatically	  new	  kinds	  of	  technologies,	  products,	  and	  use	  values	  (see	  Walker	  
forthcoming	  2016).	  Although	  the	  green	  economy’s	  “green	  growth”	  vision	  demands	  critique,	  
including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  new	  environmental	  externalities	  created	  by	  renewable	  energy	  
production	  (e.g.	  D’Alisa	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Mulvaney	  2014),	  we	  must	  seriously	  consider	  alternative	  
energies’	  more	  limited,	  strategic	  proposition:	  to	  grow	  themselves	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  fossil	  
fuels,	  a	  uniquely	  damaging	  industry	  in	  an	  era	  of	  climate	  change.	  In	  this	  sense,	  green	  
economic	  development	  suggests	  destruction	  and	  zero-­‐sum	  replacement	  as	  much	  as	  net	  
expansion	  (although	  it	  ultimately	  aims	  at	  both).	  	  
Theoretically,	  both	  Marxian	  political	  economy	  and	  Schumpeterian	  disequilibrium	  
economics	  emphasize	  technological	  development	  under	  capitalism	  as	  a	  destructive	  process,	  
one	  that	  indeed	  produces	  devaluation	  as	  much	  as	  new	  value,	  industrial	  development,	  and	  
technological	  surplus.	  Marx’s	  theorization	  of	  value	  as	  socially	  necessary	  labor	  time	  explicitly	  
defines	  the	  concept	  relationally	  and	  technologically,	  a	  contingent	  reflection	  of	  the	  state	  of	  
competition	  in	  an	  industry	  and	  the	  general	  forces	  of	  production	  in	  a	  given	  time	  and	  place.	  
From	  this	  starting	  point,	  he	  derives	  major	  insights	  into	  how	  capitalist	  producers	  are	  
compelled	  to	  constantly	  innovate	  or	  be	  outcompeted;	  enlisting	  organizational	  revolutions,	  
new	  technologies,	  and	  non-­‐human	  forces	  such	  as	  fossil	  energy	  to	  maintain	  competitive	  labor	  
productivity—	  all	  only	  postponing	  and	  socializing	  eventual	  crisis.	  In	  Marxian	  value	  terms,	  
capitalism’s	  permanent	  technological	  revolution	  manifests	  in	  part	  as	  “moral	  depreciation,”	  
when	  industrial	  fixed	  capital	  is	  devalued	  by	  technological	  competition	  before	  the	  end	  of	  its	  
useful	  material	  life.	  In	  contrast,	  Schumpeter	  draws	  on	  Marx	  but	  is	  far	  more	  sanguine	  about	  
technological	  innovation’s	  destabilizing	  tendencies.	  He	  famously	  lionizes	  “the	  perennial	  gale	  
of	  creative	  destruction”	  (Schumpeter	  [1942]	  2008,	  84)	  as	  necessary	  to	  advancing	  an	  
inventive	  capitalism.	  Schumpeter	  expands	  upon	  Marx’s	  discussion	  of	  productivity-­‐enhancing	  
technologies	  within	  existing	  industries	  in	  an	  important	  way,	  drawing	  on	  Kondratieff’s	  theory	  
of	  economic	  long	  waves:	  he	  thinks	  more	  centrally	  about	  technologies	  creating	  new	  
industries,	  and	  industrial	  revolutions	  (see	  Storper	  and	  Walker	  1989;	  Walker	  forthcoming	  
2016).	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  epochal	  transformation	  neo-­‐Schumpeterians	  now	  envision	  
for	  the	  green	  economy	  and	  its	  energy	  transition	  (Perez	  2013).	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Geographical	  political	  economy	  has	  long	  investigated	  how	  capitalism’s	  technological-­‐
economic	  upheavals	  necessarily	  express	  themselves	  as	  transformations	  in	  and	  of	  space;	  
however,	  the	  field	  is	  only	  beginning	  to	  take	  on	  specifically	  green	  devaluation.	  For	  example,	  
Storper	  and	  Walker’s	  (1989)	  theory	  of	  geographical	  industrialization	  draws	  on	  both	  Marx	  and	  
Schumpeter	  to	  theorize	  how	  cities	  and	  regions	  rise	  on	  surplus	  from	  leading	  industries	  and	  
technologies.	  It	  also	  interprets	  how	  industrial	  and	  technological	  competition	  plays	  out	  as	  a	  
struggle	  between	  places.	  Creative	  destruction	  signifies	  the	  fall	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  industrial	  
regions,	  the	  devaluation	  of	  their	  fixed	  capital	  and	  socioecological	  landscapes.	  Green	  
economic	  development	  is	  already	  demonstrating	  this	  geographic	  unevenness.	  Cleantech	  
centers	  like	  Silicon	  Valley	  compete	  with	  other	  cleantech	  clusters	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
abroad	  (e.g.	  Davies	  2013).	  More	  pointedly,	  they	  confront	  legacy	  fossil	  fuel	  production	  
regions	  and	  new	  unconventional	  extraction	  frontiers—a	  conflict	  that	  is	  fueling	  bitter	  inter-­‐
regional	  battles	  over	  US	  energy	  and	  climate	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  Harvey’s	  (1982,	  2003)	  
theory	  of	  spatial/spatio-­‐temporal	  fixation	  theorizes	  investment	  (and	  disinvestment)	  in	  fixed	  
capital	  and	  infrastructure	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  effecting	  geographic	  (de)valuation.	  As	  both	  
critical	  environmental	  scholars	  and	  political	  economists	  take	  the	  green	  economy	  more	  
seriously,	  they	  have	  begun	  to	  adapt	  the	  spatio-­‐temporal	  fix	  to	  theorize	  green	  investment	  
and	  fixed	  capital	  formation	  (Castree	  and	  Christophers	  2014;	  Ekers	  and	  Prudham	  2015;	  
McCarthy	  2015).	  	  
Finally,	  scholars	  have	  begun	  to	  consider	  green	  economic	  development	  and	  its	  energy	  
transition	  as	  forces	  for	  large-­‐scale	  devaluation	  (Castree	  and	  Christophers	  2015;	  McCarthy	  
2015),	  building	  on	  treatments	  that	  focused	  more	  on	  devaluations	  imposed	  by	  climate	  
change	  itself	  (Sayre	  2010).	  I	  argue	  that	  just	  as	  critical	  researchers	  are	  undertaking	  close	  
analyses	  of	  green	  value	  enclosure,	  we	  must	  examine	  in	  greater	  depth	  the	  specific	  discourses	  
and	  practices	  beginning	  to	  effect	  green	  devaluation.	  I	  suggest	  that	  campaigns	  around	  
cleantech	  disruption,	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment,	  and	  asset	  stranding—the	  trope	  of	  “leaving	  fossil	  
fuels	  in	  the	  ground”—represent	  an	  interrelated	  devaluation	  effort.	  These	  developing	  market	  
storylines,	  visualization	  exercises,	  and	  political	  strategies	  will	  be	  critical	  in	  realizing	  the	  kind	  
of	  structural	  political	  economic	  transformation	  outlined	  above.	  Alongside	  devaluation,	  
another	  notion	  that	  weaves	  through	  their	  discussions	  is	  obsolescence	  and,	  ultimately,	  
decommodification	  (e.g.	  Bakker	  2005;	  Prudham	  2009;	  Green	  and	  Baird	  2016;	  see	  also	  
Kopytoff	  1988).	  Tech	  industry	  practitioners	  preparing	  against	  disruptive	  innovation	  treat	  
obsolescence	  in	  increasingly	  codified	  form.	  Today,	  the	  concept	  is	  being	  adapted	  by	  climate	  
activists	  deploying	  a	  new	  language	  of	  morality,	  and	  by	  scientists	  and	  financiers	  reappraising	  
the	  future	  of	  fossil	  fuels.	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Disruptive	  Innovation	  and	  Technological	  Obsolescence	  
Since	  cleantech	  began	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  sector	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  its	  advocates	  
presented	  it	  in	  Schumpeterian	  terms.	  Caprotti	  (2012),	  unpacking	  cleantech’s	  developing	  
cultural	  economy	  during	  this	  period,	  argues	  that	  industry	  players	  drew	  a	  line	  between	  their	  
activity	  and	  earlier	  alternative	  energy	  development	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe—from	  
the	  late	  1960s/early	  1970s	  on,	  in	  generative	  centers	  like	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Bay	  Area	  (Hirsh	  
1999).	  As	  cleantech,	  renewable	  and	  alternative	  energy	  businesses	  especially	  were	  meant	  to	  
have	  come	  of	  age	  as	  a	  mainstream	  industry.	  Caprotti	  calls	  out	  in	  this	  self-­‐definition	  process	  a	  
trope	  of	  cleantech	  as	  a	  “sixth	  technological	  revolution,”	  put	  forward	  especially	  by	  
Milunovitch	  and	  Rasco	  (2008),	  a	  white	  paper	  released	  by	  Merrill	  Lynch.	  These	  arguments	  
drew	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Schumpeterian	  scholar	  Carlota	  Perez,	  especially	  her	  
adaptation	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  thought	  on	  industrial	  revolutions	  to	  interpret	  the	  New	  
Economy/dot-­‐com	  boom	  of	  the	  late	  1990s	  (Perez	  2003).	  Similar	  framings	  of	  cleantech	  and	  
the	  green	  economy	  as	  an	  industrial	  revolution	  have	  since	  been	  advanced	  academically	  by	  
Matthews	  (2013),	  and,	  recently,	  Perez	  herself	  (2013).	  	  
	   Echoing	  Davies	  (2013),	  I	  maintain	  that	  deeper	  engagement	  with	  the	  high-­‐tech	  regions	  
(and	  organized	  and	  branded	  “clusters”)	  most	  actively	  producing	  and	  circulating	  cleantech	  
discourses	  suggests	  further	  insights	  into	  the	  sector.	  Particularly,	  I	  argue	  that	  cleantech’s	  
narratives	  and	  experience	  have	  been	  powerfully	  influenced	  by	  its	  origins	  in	  Silicon	  Valley	  and	  
the	  San	  Francisco	  Bay	  Area.	  Bay	  Area	  cleantech	  promoters	  in	  the	  2000s	  often	  called	  back	  to	  
the	  region’s	  longstanding	  leadership	  in	  solar,	  wind,	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  development.	  
However,	  industry	  insiders	  point	  to	  the	  2000-­‐2001	  dot-­‐com	  collapse	  and	  its	  aftermath	  as	  the	  
key	  generative	  moment	  for	  cleantech	  in	  its	  current	  form	  (e.g.	  GigaOm,	  November	  28,	  2011,	  
Luce	  and	  Steel	  2015)—that	  Silicon	  Valley	  venture	  capitalists	  and	  regional	  economic	  
development	  agencies	  were	  casting	  around	  for	  possibilities	  to	  replace	  the	  momentum	  and	  
returns	  lost	  by	  information	  and	  communications	  technology	  (ICT).	  A	  survey	  of	  tech	  industry	  
literature	  and	  more	  specialized	  reporting	  on	  cleantech	  (e.g.	  in	  Wired,	  TechCrunch,	  GigaOm,	  
GreenTech	  Media,	  Grist,	  and	  so	  on)	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  suggests	  that	  US	  cleantech	  has	  
continued	  to	  narrate	  its	  experience	  strongly	  in	  terms	  of	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  rising	  –	  and	  for	  years	  
now,	  falling—interest;	  for	  example,	  a	  widely	  cited	  2007	  TED	  talk	  by	  John	  Doerr,	  of	  the	  
famous	  Silicon	  Valley	  venture	  capital	  firm	  Kleiner	  Perkins	  Caufield	  &	  Byers	  (Wired,	  January	  
20,	  2012;	  Reuters,	  January	  16,	  2013).	  Another	  touchstone	  is	  the	  trajectory	  of	  cleantech-­‐
specific	  reporting	  from	  Silicon	  Valley-­‐dominated	  outlets	  such	  as	  the	  
PricewaterhouseCoopers/National	  Venture	  Capital	  Association	  MoneyTree™	  Report.	  
	   One	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  discourses	  that	  cleantech	  inherited	  from	  Silicon	  Valley	  
tech	  culture	  in	  the	  1990s	  has	  been	  the	  trope	  of	  disruption	  and	  a	  related	  set	  of	  value	  
conversations	  around	  obsolescence.	  First,	  disruptive	  innovation,	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Harvard	  
Business	  School’s	  Clayton	  Christensen	  (1997)	  during	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble,	  is	  a	  reworking	  of	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Schumpeter’s	  notion	  of	  creative	  destruction	  that	  quickly	  became	  a	  central	  imaginary	  in	  
Silicon	  Valley	  (e.g.	  The	  New	  Yorker,	  June	  23,	  2014;	  Forbes,	  July	  3,	  2014;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  June	  10,	  2000).	  Broadly	  speaking,	  disruption	  talk	  among	  tech	  entrepreneurs	  and	  
speculative	  venture	  capitalists	  champions	  innovation-­‐driven	  destabilization	  as	  a	  positive	  
force.	  More	  specifically,	  disruption	  is	  seen	  as	  necessary	  to	  the	  outsize	  returns	  on	  supposedly	  
radically	  experimental,	  high-­‐risk	  start-­‐ups	  that	  both	  groups	  eternally	  seek.	  It	  portrays	  older	  
industries	  as	  staid,	  outdated,	  and	  ripe	  for	  enforced	  irrelevance	  by	  bold	  young	  technological	  
challengers.	  Moreover,	  it	  recasts	  an	  ongoing	  high	  failure	  rate	  among	  enterprises	  as	  a	  
regional	  strength—evidence	  of	  an	  ambitious,	  restless,	  and	  flexible	  start-­‐up	  culture.	  These	  
discourses	  have	  helped	  produce	  their	  own	  reality,	  structuring	  practices	  and	  expectations	  for	  
incoming	  generations	  of	  entrepreneurs	  and	  funders.	  	  
Second,	  in	  value	  terms,	  more	  rapid	  rates	  of	  disruption	  have	  translated	  into	  
accelerated	  technological/technical	  obsolescence,	  particularly	  in	  ICT	  products	  and	  
production	  chains.	  Sandborn	  (2007)	  estimated	  that	  in	  2007	  three	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  global	  
pool	  of	  electronic	  parts	  then	  went	  obsolete	  every	  month.	  Consistent	  with	  Marx’s	  moral	  
depreciation,	  these	  technologies	  have	  often	  been	  devalued	  well	  before	  the	  end	  of	  their	  
materially	  functional	  life—socially	  rather	  than	  materially	  “manufactured”	  or	  “planned”	  
obsolescence	  (although	  often	  both)	  (Slade	  2009).	  They	  have	  typically	  been	  devalued	  in	  an	  
absolute	  and	  “incurable”	  sense,	  one	  that	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  qualitative	  techno-­‐social	  
paradigm	  shifts	  than	  quantitative	  advances	  in	  productivity.	  They	  are	  stripped	  of	  use	  value	  
when	  replaced	  or	  made	  archaic,	  of	  exchange	  value	  when	  removed	  from	  markets,	  of	  fresh	  
infusions	  of	  value	  (as	  socially	  necessary	  labor	  time)	  once	  removed	  from	  active	  production.1	  
American	  economists,	  accountants,	  and	  business	  theorists	  had	  discussed	  innovation	  and	  the	  
issue	  of	  technological	  obsolescence	  for	  decades	  before	  the	  New	  Economy	  boom	  (e.g.	  Eisner	  
1956;	  Green	  and	  Sorter	  1959),	  after	  the	  concept	  was	  widely	  popularized	  in	  the	  1910s-­‐1920s	  
by	  the	  automobile	  industry’s	  technological	  and	  design	  revolutions,	  especially	  its	  introduction	  
of	  annual	  model	  changes	  (Slade	  2009).	  However,	  intensifying	  threat	  of	  obsolescence	  in	  
today’s	  era	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  disruption	  produced	  an	  increasingly	  codified	  set	  of	  practices	  for	  
appraising	  “obsolescence	  risk”—for	  retail	  products,	  intermediate	  goods,	  manufacturing	  
technologies,	  and	  whole	  production	  chains	  (Barreca	  1998;	  Sandborn	  2007).	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  
these	  risk	  assessment	  tools	  are	  now	  being	  translated	  into	  instruments	  for	  climate	  change	  
analysis	  and	  organizing.	  
As	  per	  the	  new	  usual,	  disruption	  thinking	  guided	  the	  way	  Silicon	  Valley	  took	  on	  
cleantech	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  In	  2006	  the	  region’s	  disruption	  culture	  already	  demonstrated	  
problems	  that	  have	  only	  become	  clearer	  since.	  Internal	  and	  external	  critics	  have	  slammed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  My	  interpretation	  of	  obsolescence	  here	  diverges	  from	  Weber	  (2002),	  who	  examines	  economic	  obsolescence	  
classification	  in	  real	  estate	  and	  argues	  that	  obsolescence	  works	  more	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  exchange	  values	  than	  use	  
values,	  especially	  in	  contrast	  to	  blight	  classifications.	  	  
8	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Silicon	  Valley’s	  “cult”	  of	  disruption	  as	  increasingly	  destructive	  and	  amoral	  (PandoDaily,	  
October	  24,	  2012),	  and	  venture	  capital’s	  speculative	  rent-­‐seeking	  as	  shortsighted	  and	  
exploitive	  of	  prior	  state	  investment	  (Mazzucato	  2013)—both	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  socially	  
beneficial	  role	  the	  region	  attempted	  to	  claim	  with	  cleantech.	  Moreover,	  disruption’s	  
acceleration	  of	  obsolescence	  has	  generated	  mountains	  of	  electronic	  (e-­‐)waste	  (Slade	  2009;	  
Knapp	  2016),	  a	  major	  contradiction	  in	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  green	  claims.	  Nonetheless,	  
entrepreneurs	  and	  venture	  capitalists	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  model	  to	  guide	  their	  visions	  of	  a	  
cleantech	  revolution	  (Nordan	  2011;	  Hargadon	  and	  Kenney	  2012;	  Luce	  and	  Steel	  2015).	  In	  
cleantech’s	  case,	  would-­‐be	  disruptors	  typically	  targeted	  the	  existing	  energy	  industry,	  aiming	  
to	  seize	  market	  share	  from	  investor-­‐owned	  utilities	  and	  fossil	  fuel	  companies.	  Inherited	  ICT-­‐
based	  models	  of	  disruption	  suggested	  that	  relatively	  small,	  minimally	  capitalized	  start-­‐ups	  
could	  use	  innovative	  technologies	  to	  seize	  a	  large	  market	  share	  and	  command	  outsize	  
technological	  rents:	  	  
VC	  investors	  who	  had	  experience	  with	  software	  and	  semiconductors,	  the	  traditional	  
lifeblood	  of	  Silicon	  Valley,	  viewed	  cleantech	  investing	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  these	  areas…	  
Looking	  at	  a	  global	  energy	  market,	  which	  is	  measured	  in	  trillions	  of	  dollars,	  the	  premise	  
for	  cleantech	  investing	  became:	  “If	  we	  can	  disrupt	  just	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  that	  market,	  
then	  we’ll	  make	  an	  enormous	  company.”	  (Luce	  and	  Steel	  2015,	  191)	  
	  
	   Flaws	  in	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  model	  of	  green	  economic	  development	  and	  energy	  transition	  
bear	  major	  responsibility	  for	  failures	  in	  US	  cleantech	  since	  the	  late	  2000s	  boom.	  Cleantech’s	  
troubles	  have	  included	  a	  raft	  of	  prominent	  corporate	  failures,	  especially	  of	  capital-­‐intensive	  
manufacturing	  start-­‐ups	  like	  Solyndra;	  significant	  investment	  losses;	  and	  plummeting	  new	  
early-­‐stage	  investment	  and	  venture	  capital	  interest.	  These	  problems	  have	  had	  multiple,	  well-­‐
known	  causes;	  for	  example,	  a	  surge	  in	  Chinese	  renewable	  energy	  manufacturing	  and	  cheap	  
exports	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  lure	  of	  far	  quicker	  and	  easier	  profits	  from	  a	  fresh	  ICT	  
boom	  around	  social	  media	  and	  the	  “sharing”	  economy.	  However,	  industry	  insiders	  broadly	  
acknowledge	  that	  their	  ICT-­‐informed	  model	  of	  disruption	  and	  its	  financing	  simply	  worked	  
poorly	  against	  an	  entrenched	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  especially	  amid	  a	  boom	  in	  unconventional	  
extraction	  that	  dramatically	  lowered	  commodity	  energy	  prices	  (e.g.	  Nordan	  2011;	  Hargadon	  
and	  Kenney	  2012).	  Entrepreneurs	  and	  venture	  capitalists	  began	  to	  understand	  that	  “one	  
can’t	  just	  ‘disrupt	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  [the	  energy	  market]’…	  successful	  companies	  have	  to	  
scale	  up	  in	  the	  face	  of	  longstanding	  distribution	  networks,	  legacy	  systems,	  and	  deeply	  rooted	  
relationships.	  Even	  with	  better	  technology,	  a	  small	  player	  won’t	  succeed	  if	  it	  can’t	  take	  its	  
technology	  to	  market”	  (Luce	  and	  Steel	  2015,	  191).	  Despite	  would-­‐be	  disruptors’	  rhetorical	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Fossil	  Fuel	  Divestment	  and	  “Moral”	  Obsolescence	  
While	  a	  wave	  of	  cleantech	  start-­‐ups	  battered	  against	  powerful	  fossil	  fuel	  interests,	  climate	  
activists	  were	  similarly	  moving	  toward	  a	  more	  directly	  confrontational	  stance.	  Notably,	  high-­‐
profile	  disappointments	  such	  as	  the	  2009	  United	  Nations	  climate	  meeting	  in	  Copenhagen	  
and	  the	  2010	  failure	  of	  the	  Waxman-­‐Markey	  Bill,	  initially	  seen	  as	  a	  probable	  prospect	  for	  
binding	  US	  national	  greenhouse	  gas	  limitation	  and	  a	  critical	  aid	  to	  energy	  alternatives,	  
provoked	  widespread	  soul-­‐searching	  within	  climate	  advocacy.	  Commissioned	  by	  the	  
Rockefeller	  Family	  Fund,	  an	  analysis	  of	  Waxman-­‐Markey’s	  failure	  from	  the	  prominent	  
sociologist	  Theda	  Skocpol	  (2013)	  blamed	  the	  environmental	  establishment	  for	  taking	  an	  
overly	  conciliatory	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  fossil	  fuel	  companies,	  including	  their	  portrayal	  of	  natural	  
gas	  as	  a	  “transition	  fuel”.	  Skocpol	  argued	  that	  neoliberal	  mainstreaming	  might	  have	  gained	  
major	  environmental	  groups	  an	  insider	  seat	  at	  the	  table	  with	  industry	  players	  and	  
policymakers,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  actual	  efficacy	  –	  that	  by	  abandoning	  grassroots	  
activism,	  they	  had	  sacrificed	  the	  force	  that	  a	  more	  radical,	  energized	  base	  could	  bring	  to	  
bear	  against	  fossil	  industry	  power.	  Skocpol’s	  report	  provoked	  considerable	  debate	  within	  the	  
environmental	  movement	  (Grist,	  March	  15,	  2013)	  but	  reflected	  a	  growing	  mood	  in	  US	  
climate	  advocacy.	  Activists	  increasingly	  saw	  a	  direct	  assault	  on	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  as	  
necessary	  to	  forcing	  transformations	  needed	  for	  climate	  justice—like	  Schumpeterian	  talk	  of	  
disruption,	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  “win-­‐win”	  anemia	  of	  neoliberal	  ecological	  modernism.	  
Organizations	  such	  as	  350.org	  have	  prominently	  taken	  up	  this	  call	  (Grist,	  January	  14,	  2013),	  
helping	  enlist	  US	  college	  campuses	  and	  urban	  organizers	  behind	  an	  international	  movement	  
for	  climate	  justice,	  one	  that	  prominently	  features	  direct	  action	  against	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  
and	  its	  infrastructure	  (e.g.	  Bond	  2011).	  
	   A	  central	  platform	  of	  this	  increasingly	  combative	  climate	  organizing	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  has	  been	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment.	  The	  call	  for	  divestment	  was	  most	  visibly	  sparked	  by	  a	  
highly	  influential	  2012	  article	  written	  by	  Bill	  McKibben	  in	  Rolling	  Stone	  (July	  19,	  2012).	  Other	  
important	  framing	  came	  from	  Naomi	  Klein	  (2014).	  Loosely	  unified	  by	  350.org	  since	  2012	  via	  
its	  Go	  Fossil	  Free	  campaign	  but	  run	  on	  the	  ground	  by	  hundreds	  of	  organizations	  on	  college	  
campuses,	  in	  cities,	  and	  in	  other	  institutional	  spaces,	  the	  movement	  called	  for	  institutional	  
investors	  and	  corporations	  to	  publically	  divest	  their	  fossil	  fuel	  holdings	  (Rolling	  Stone,	  
February	  22,	  2013,	  East	  Bay	  Express,	  May	  8,	  2013).	  As	  defined	  by	  350.org	  (2016),	  “full”	  
divestment	  requires	  an	  institution	  or	  corporation	  to	  make	  a	  binding	  commitment	  to	  shed	  all	  
coal,	  oil,	  and	  natural	  gas	  investments—direct	  stocks,	  corporate	  bonds,	  and	  shares	  in	  mutual	  
funds	  containing	  fossil	  fuel	  assets.	  Utilizing	  proprietary	  analysis	  conducted	  by	  Fossil	  Free	  
Indexes,	  a	  private	  financial	  research	  company,	  350.org	  especially	  encourages	  divestors	  to	  
target	  the	  world’s	  “top	  200”	  fossil	  fuel	  companies,	  ranked	  by	  the	  carbon	  content	  of	  their	  
reserves.	  “Partial”	  divestors	  pledge	  to	  withdraw	  their	  investment	  in	  particularly	  carbon-­‐
intensive	  fuels:	  coal	  and/or	  tar	  sands.	  According	  to	  350.org,	  as	  of	  August	  2016,	  550	  
10	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institutions	  worldwide	  had	  made	  full	  or	  partial	  divestment	  pledges,	  including	  (ordered	  by	  
number	  of	  pledgees	  rather	  than	  valuation)	  faith-­‐based	  groups,	  foundations,	  governments,	  
universities	  and	  other	  educational	  institutions,	  pension	  funds,	  NGOs,	  for-­‐profit	  corporations,	  
and	  healthcare	  organizations.	  
	   In	  its	  divestment	  advocacy,	  the	  framing	  language	  adopted	  by	  350.org	  is	  explicitly	  one	  
of	  morality	  rather	  than	  economics.	  The	  organization	  defines	  divestment	  as	  shedding	  
investments	  that	  are	  “unethical	  or	  morally	  ambiguous,”	  arguing:	  
	  
Fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  takes	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  to	  task	  for	  its	  culpability	  in	  the	  climate	  
crisis.	  By	  naming	  this	  industry’s	  singularly	  destructive	  influence—and	  by	  highlighting	  the	  
moral	  dimensions	  of	  climate	  change—we	  hope	  that	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  movement	  
can	  help	  break	  the	  hold	  that	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  has	  on	  our	  economy	  and	  our	  
governments.	  (350.org	  2016)	  
	  
Particularly,	  350.org	  targets	  fossil	  fuel	  companies’	  “veneer	  of	  legitimacy,”	  arguing	  that	  
institutional	  investors’	  public	  distancing	  can	  remove	  this	  “‘social	  license	  to	  operate’”	  (350.org	  
2016).	  Both	  350.org	  and	  popular	  commentators	  have	  located	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  within	  a	  
longer	  tradition,	  identifying	  it	  with	  past	  ethically	  justified	  divestment	  campaigns—against	  
Sudan	  in	  the	  late	  2000s,	  pressuring	  the	  government	  to	  end	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur;	  and	  
especially	  the	  influential	  1980s	  campaign	  to	  divest	  from	  Apartheid	  South	  African	  holdings.	  
Prominent	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  divest	  from	  big	  tobacco	  have	  also	  been	  cited	  as	  an	  influence	  
(Rolling	  Stone	  July	  19,	  2012,	  February	  22,	  2013;	  East	  Bay	  Express,	  May	  8,	  2013;	  Huffington	  
Post,	  November	  2,	  2013).	  Other	  moral-­‐political	  divestment	  campaigns	  on	  college	  campuses	  
today	  protest	  Israeli	  policy	  on	  Palestine	  and	  the	  US	  private	  prison	  industry.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  
divestment	  activists	  have	  particularly	  targeted	  institutions	  and	  investors	  with	  a	  public	  
mandate,	  social	  purpose,	  and/or	  reputation	  to	  protect.	  For	  some,	  like	  universities,	  
divestment	  is	  the	  latest	  tool	  in	  a	  long	  effort	  to	  exert	  moral	  leadership	  on	  climate	  change	  (e.g.	  
Knuth	  et	  al.	  2007)—if	  a	  particularly	  contentious	  one.	  In	  recent	  years,	  students	  have	  
frequently	  battled	  university	  administrations	  over	  divestment,	  with	  Harvard	  University	  
students	  going	  far	  as	  to	  sue	  the	  university	  over	  its	  failure	  to	  divest.	  
	   One	  reason	  that	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  movement	  has	  adopted	  a	  rhetorical	  
strategy	  of	  moral	  shaming	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  leverage	  its	  influence,	  and	  its	  particular	  type	  of	  
influence,	  against	  a	  far	  more	  economically	  powerful	  opponent.	  Proponents	  have	  had	  to	  be	  
open	  about	  these	  tactics	  almost	  from	  the	  movement’s	  beginnings	  (Rolling	  Stone,	  February	  
22,	  2013),	  given	  the	  small	  dollar	  value	  of	  investments	  initially	  withdrawn	  relative	  to	  the	  total	  
capitalization	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  companies,	  and	  these	  companies’	  propensity	  to	  self-­‐fund	  from	  
profits	  rather	  than	  turning	  to	  stock	  markets—a	  subject	  of	  early	  critiques	  from	  Christian	  
Parenti	  and	  others	  (The	  Huffington	  Post,	  November	  29,	  2012;	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  
11	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27,	  2013;	  East	  Bay	  Express,	  May	  8,	  2013).	  In	  emerging	  critical	  scholarship	  on	  the	  movement,	  
Rowe	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  defend	  its	  strategy	  in	  Gramscian	  terms,	  emphasizing	  its	  work	  to	  
destabilize	  consent	  for	  the	  existing	  order.	  They	  argue	  that	  despite	  divestment’s	  seeming	  
congruence	  with	  anti-­‐statist	  neoliberal	  environmental	  movements	  like	  sustainable	  
consumption	  and	  shareholder	  activism,	  its	  goals	  are	  political:	  to	  weaken	  forces	  working	  to	  
block	  state	  intervention,	  using	  tools	  uniquely	  available	  to	  activists.	  This	  analysis	  seems	  
consistent	  with	  post-­‐Waxman-­‐Markey	  discussions	  in	  the	  US	  context	  and	  with	  350.org’s	  own	  
framing.	  
I	  argue	  that	  the	  divestment	  movement’s	  appeals	  to	  the	  moral-­‐political	  realm	  also	  
further	  a	  deeper	  aim.	  Precisely	  by	  largely	  avoiding	  overt	  talk	  of	  the	  economic,	  divestment	  
activists	  advance	  a	  case	  for	  the	  more	  absolute	  devaluation	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  and	  its	  
assets.	  We	  might	  describe	  their	  goal	  as	  “moral”	  obsolescence.2	  Cleantech’s	  language	  of	  
disruption	  and	  obsolescence	  is	  ethically	  neutral,	  reflecting	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  libertarianism	  and	  
futurism	  (Turner	  2006).	  Products	  and	  sectors	  are	  rendered	  technologically/techno-­‐socially	  
obsolete	  because	  they	  have	  become	  out-­‐of-­‐date,	  unfashionable,	  or	  archaic.	  By	  contrast,	  
divestment’s	  logic	  implicitly	  invokes	  notions	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  progress:	  products	  and	  
sectors	  forced	  into	  obsolescence	  because	  right-­‐thinking	  society	  has	  come	  to	  deem	  them	  
unethical.	  This	  logic	  applies	  to	  tainted	  but	  only	  as-­‐yet	  devalued	  “vice”	  commodities	  like	  
tobacco	  (The	  Huffington	  Post,	  November	  2,	  2013)	  and,	  especially,	  “commodities”	  turned	  
back	  into	  non-­‐commodities,	  as	  with	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  (Kopytoff	  1988).	  This	  argument	  
adds	  major	  weight	  to	  conflicts	  with	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  particularly	  a	  “leave	  it	  in	  the	  
ground”	  campaign	  against	  burning	  existing	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves—it	  is	  well	  worth	  underlining	  
parallels	  with	  slavers’	  protests	  against	  abolition	  as	  the	  mass	  devaluation	  of	  property	  and	  
regions	  economically	  dependent	  upon	  it	  (Davidson	  2008).	  In	  this	  vein,	  divestment’s	  logic	  
seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  categorical	  decommodification	  of	  fossil	  fuels—ironically,	  considering	  that	  
the	  thrust	  of	  green	  capitalism	  has	  been	  to	  argue	  away	  ethical	  resistance	  to	  putting	  a	  price	  on	  
(more	  of)	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  nature,	  although	  certainly	  not	  without	  precedent	  (Bakker	  
2005,	  Prudham	  2009;	  Green	  and	  Baird	  2016).	  	  
Although	  Rowe	  et	  al.	  (2016),	  among	  other	  interpreters,	  find	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  
consistent	  with	  a	  broader	  anti-­‐capitalist	  agenda,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  movement	  more	  
immediately	  serves	  the	  intra-­‐capitalist	  struggle	  outlined	  here.	  Divestment	  in	  fossil	  fuels	  
diverges	  in	  important,	  under-­‐analyzed	  ways	  from	  other	  divestment	  campaigns.	  First,	  it	  aims	  
to	  remove	  a	  product	  from	  the	  market	  rather	  than	  change	  political	  practice—the	  anti-­‐
tobacco	  industry	  campaign	  is	  its	  closest	  analog,	  and	  more	  recently	  private	  prison	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  I	  draw	  on	  Marx’s	  (1990)	  “moral	  depreciation”	  here	  but	  in	  an	  inexact	  way;	  his	  moralische	  translates	  more	  
nearly	  to	  “human”	  or	  “social.”	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divestment.	  Second,	  uniquely,	  that	  targeted	  product	  demands	  a	  licit	  market	  replacement.3	  
Although	  divestment	  activists	  might	  certainly	  advocate	  energy	  conservation	  and	  broader	  
social	  and	  economic	  reorganization	  over	  the	  longer	  term,	  in	  the	  immediate	  moment	  high-­‐
energy	  societies	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  turn	  to	  renewable	  energy	  and	  other	  cleantech	  
industries	  to	  replace	  a	  staple	  commodity.	  In	  other	  words,	  divestment	  may	  be	  as	  powerful	  an	  
aid	  to	  would-­‐be	  disruptive	  innovators	  as	  it	  is	  to	  climate	  regulators	  or	  degrowth	  activists	  
(D’Alisa	  et	  al.	  2014).	  It	  stands	  to	  weaken	  or	  remove	  obstacles	  that	  have	  blocked	  their	  
economic	  success,	  especially	  if	  it	  succeeds	  in	  also	  clearing	  the	  way	  for	  more	  powerful	  climate	  
change	  regulation	  and	  green	  economic/industrial	  policy.	  
	  Divestment	  explicitly	  attacks	  fossil	  fuel	  industries	  but	  only	  tacitly	  supports	  their	  
potential	  green	  replacements,	  a	  move	  that	  separates	  it	  from	  its	  recent	  grassroots	  
antecedent,	  the	  green	  collar	  jobs	  movement	  of	  the	  late	  2000s.	  This	  campaign	  saw	  
community	  organizers,	  environmental	  justice	  advocates,	  and	  labor	  interests	  team	  up	  to	  
officially	  champion	  cleantech	  and	  green	  Keynesianism.	  In	  a	  candid	  interview	  in	  Antipode,	  its	  
well-­‐known	  advocate	  Van	  Jones	  presented	  a	  notably	  Gramscian	  vision:	  alliance	  with	  a	  green	  
capital	  bloc	  against	  a	  fossil	  fuel-­‐dominated	  one	  as	  a	  pragmatic,	  temporary	  move	  in	  a	  longer	  
justice	  fight	  (Mirpuri	  et	  al.	  2009).	  In	  contrast,	  although	  particular	  local	  divestment	  campaigns	  
might	  indeed	  choose	  to	  undertake	  both	  divestment	  and	  green	  reinvestment,	  350.org’s	  
official	  framing	  avoids	  direct	  advocacy	  for	  alternative	  energy	  investments,	  general	  or	  
specific:	  evidently,	  its	  moral	  appeal	  requires	  it	  to	  stay	  officially	  above	  the	  fray	  of	  intra-­‐
capitalist	  battles.	  Divestment’s	  support	  may	  be	  all	  the	  more	  powerful	  for	  being	  indirect,	  even	  
as	  this	  disconnect	  produces	  peculiar	  outcomes	  on	  the	  ground—for	  example,	  California’s	  
massive	  state	  pension	  fund	  CalPERS	  shedding	  troubled	  cleantech	  investments	  even	  as	  
California	  state	  law	  requires	  it	  to	  divest	  from	  coal	  (GigaOm,	  March	  12,	  2013,	  Los	  Angeles	  
Times,	  October	  18,	  2015).	  
	  
Asset	  Stranding	  and	  Decommodification	  
Finally,	  a	  key	  reason	  that	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  activism	  has	  been	  able	  to	  assume	  the	  moral	  
high	  ground	  in	  its	  tactics	  is	  that	  it	  is	  now	  part	  of	  a	  broader,	  overtly	  economic	  movement	  
tackling	  the	  issue	  of	  stranded	  assets	  and	  climate	  change.	  “Leave	  it	  in	  the	  ground”	  arguments	  
against	  fossil	  fuel	  reserve	  consumption	  are	  effectively	  being	  advanced	  not	  only	  by	  
environmental	  activists	  and	  climate	  scientists	  but	  also	  by	  banks	  and	  institutional	  investors,	  
business	  risk	  analysts,	  and	  other	  financial	  interests.	  In	  their	  initial	  calls	  for	  divestment,	  both	  
Bill	  McKibben	  and	  Naomi	  Klein	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative,	  
a	  non-­‐profit	  financial	  think	  tank	  operating	  out	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  that	  analyzes	  “carbon	  
investment	  risk”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2015a);	  350.org’s	  use	  of	  Fossil	  Free	  Indexes	  maintains	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Again,	  with	  abolition	  as	  the	  closest	  non-­‐divestment	  parallel,	  although	  the	  replacement	  demanded	  now	  is	  
more	  specialized	  than	  commodified	  “free”	  labor	  power.	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financial	  connection.	  A	  number	  of	  similar	  investor-­‐targeted	  nonprofits	  such	  as	  the	  Stranded	  
Assets	  Research	  Network	  (SARN),	  run	  out	  of	  Oxford’s	  business	  school;	  financial	  analysts;	  and	  
major	  financial	  institutions	  (e.g.	  HSBC	  2013;	  IDB	  2015)	  have	  begun	  to	  formally	  evaluate	  and	  
price	  climate-­‐related	  risks	  for	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  and	  their	  assets	  –	  from	  divestment	  and	  
other	  climate	  policy,	  technological	  risk	  from	  cleantech	  energy	  challengers,	  climate	  change	  
itself,	  and	  so	  on	  (Ansar	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Centrally,	  these	  efforts	  refer	  to	  the	  International	  Energy	  
Agency’s	  (IEA)	  recent	  estimates	  (e.g.	  IEA	  2013)	  that	  a	  major	  fraction	  of	  existing	  world	  fossil	  
fuel	  reserves	  must	  go	  unburned	  to	  limit	  global	  warming	  to	  2°C	  or	  less.	  As	  McGlade	  and	  Ekins	  
(2015)	  similarly	  calculate	  in	  Nature,	  “globally,	  a	  third	  of	  oil	  reserves,	  half	  of	  gas	  reserves	  and	  
over	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  current	  coal	  reserves	  should	  remain	  unused	  from	  2010	  to	  2050	  in	  order	  
to	  meet	  the	  target	  of	  2°C”	  (2015,	  187).	  	  
	   This	  broad	  financial	  movement	  eschews	  divestment’s	  moral	  rhetoric	  about	  the	  
numbers	  above	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  ostensibly	  ethically	  neutral,	  self-­‐interested	  economic	  warning.	  
It	  argues	  that	  holding	  fossil	  fuel	  assets	  increasingly	  threatens	  companies	  and	  investors	  with	  
epochal	  devaluation—although,	  like	  divestment,	  its	  discourses	  typically	  do	  not	  explicitly	  
promote	  cleantech	  and	  fossil	  fuels’	  industrial	  challengers.	  Rhetorically,	  it	  takes	  up	  the	  issue	  
of	  “stranded	  assets.”	  Statements	  by	  SARN	  have	  helped	  codify	  a	  definition	  of	  environmental	  
risk-­‐related	  stranding,	  where	  “assets	  suffer	  from	  unanticipated	  or	  premature	  write-­‐offs,	  
downward	  revaluations	  or	  are	  converted	  to	  liabilities”	  (Business	  Green,	  October	  8,	  2013).	  
Premature	  obsolescence	  and	  stranded	  costs	  have	  been	  a	  familiar	  topic	  of	  energy	  industry	  
discussion	  for	  decades,	  in	  the	  United	  States	  especially	  after	  the	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  
Commission	  (FERC)	  formally	  codified	  accelerated	  asset	  depreciation	  and	  cost	  recovery	  
procedures	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  neoliberal	  electricity	  deregulation	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Hirsh	  1999).	  
Industry	  conversations	  have	  borrowed	  much	  from	  general	  tech	  industry	  and	  ICT	  framings	  of	  
obsolescence,	  normalizing	  and	  accounting	  for	  “stranding”	  risk	  as	  a	  cost	  of	  technological	  
development.	  However,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  devaluation	  threatened	  under	  climate	  change	  has	  
shifted	  the	  conversation,	  as	  investors	  warn	  of	  epochal	  write-­‐downs	  in	  the	  valuation	  of	  fossil	  
fuel	  companies	  and	  their	  assets,	  and	  similarly	  scaled	  losses	  to	  investors	  exposed	  to	  them.	  
They	  are	  increasingly	  pressuring	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  to	  track	  and	  disclose	  these	  risks	  to	  
shareholders	  and	  financiers	  (CERES	  2013).	  Carbon	  Tracker	  (2011)	  now	  argues	  that	  by	  holding	  
and	  planning	  to	  acquire	  trillions	  of	  dollars	  in	  “unburnable”	  assets,4	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  are	  
inflating	  a	  “carbon	  bubble,”	  value-­‐at-­‐risk	  sizeable	  enough	  to	  imperil	  the	  global	  financial	  
system:	  
Given	  that	  only	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  reserves	  [of	  fossil	  fuels]	  can	  be	  used	  to	  stay	  below	  
2°C	  warming…	  then	  only	  149	  of	  the	  745	  GtCO2	  listed	  can	  be	  used	  unmitigated.	  This	  is	  
where	  the	  carbon	  asset	  bubble	  is	  located.	  If	  applied	  to	  the	  world’s	  stock	  markets,	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Carbon	  Tracker	  (2015)	  estimates	  a	  $2	  trillion	  “danger	  zone”	  in	  unneeded	  capital	  expenditures	  through	  2025,	  
planned	  spending	  that	  must	  be	  curtailed	  to	  avert	  156	  GTCO2	  of	  emissions.	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could	  result	  in	  a	  repricing	  of	  assets	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  would	  dwarf	  past	  profit	  warnings	  and	  
revaluation	  of	  reserves.	  This	  situation	  persists	  because	  no	  financial	  regulator	  is	  
responsible	  for	  monitoring,	  collating	  or	  interpreting	  these	  risks.	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  9)	  
	  
	   The	  kind	  of	  decommodification	  suggested	  by	  these	  financial	  players	  is	  different	  from	  
the	  absolute	  moral	  obsolescence	  implied	  by	  the	  divestment	  movement,	  but	  is	  ultimately	  no	  
less	  radical.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  question,	  empirically	  and	  politically,	  if	  climate	  change	  can	  be	  
averted	  by	  the	  partial	  decommodification	  of	  a	  quantitatively	  reduced	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  and	  
fossil	  carbon	  footprint.	  The	  lure	  of	  unburned	  reserves	  may	  prove	  too	  great	  without	  a	  more	  
qualitative	  break	  in	  energy	  provision,	  practices,	  and	  cultural	  norms.	  Even	  if	  fossil	  fuel	  
reserves	  are	  declared	  unburnable,	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  decommodify	  them—for	  
example,	  as	  feedstocks	  for	  the	  petrochemical	  industry	  (Romero	  2016).	  However,	  the	  sheer	  
weight	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  numbers	  involved	  here—for	  example,	  $2	  trillion	  in	  stranded	  capital	  
expenditures	  by	  2025,	  almost	  half	  the	  industry’s	  total	  current	  valuation	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  
2015b;	  BNEF	  2014);	  a	  global	  geography	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  devalued,	  property	  
decommodified,	  and	  socioecological	  relations	  transformed	  (IEA	  2013;	  McGlade	  and	  Ekins	  
2015)—suggest	  quantitative	  changes	  that	  can	  readily	  aggregate	  and	  transmute	  into	  a	  
qualitative	  shift,	  in	  classic	  dialectical	  fashion.	  As	  with	  divestment,	  some	  of	  financial	  activism’s	  
most	  powerful	  politics	  here	  are	  tacit.	  Notably,	  the	  stranded	  assets	  argument	  is	  performative	  
(MacKenzie	  et	  al.	  2008)	  and	  prefigurative	  in	  two	  ways	  that	  ally	  it	  with	  both	  divestment	  
activism	  and	  cleantech.	  First,	  it	  is	  predicated	  upon	  effective	  climate	  regulation	  –	  and	  may	  
therefore	  help	  assume	  it	  into	  being.	  Second,	  it	  invokes	  a	  nascent	  gap	  and	  need	  for	  
replacement,	  in	  both	  material	  (energy	  supply)	  and	  value	  terms—a	  clear	  opportunity	  for	  
green	  entrepreneurs	  and	  investors.	  
	  
Conclusions	  and	  Further	  Research	  
This	  broad	  survey	  of	  contemporary	  green	  economic	  politics	  developing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  beyond	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  environmental	  and	  economic	  scholars	  must	  expand	  their	  
thinking	  on	  value	  to	  capture	  essential	  features	  of	  an	  emerging	  twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  green	  
capitalism.	  Moving	  beyond	  neoliberal	  environmentalism’s	  weak	  “win-­‐win”	  visions	  means	  
dealing	  with	  contestation,	  winners,	  and	  losers,	  including	  among	  capitalists.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  
critique	  the	  imaginary	  of	  green	  growth,	  but	  green	  growth	  is	  not	  the	  only	  project	  at	  play	  here.	  
Would-­‐be	  green	  capitalists	  and	  climate	  activists	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  zero-­‐
sum	  stakes	  and	  the	  need	  for	  techno-­‐industrial	  replacement—even	  if	  critical	  scholarship	  is	  
lagging	  behind	  them	  in	  this	  realization.	  These	  struggles	  within	  capitalist	  centers	  and	  between	  
green	  and	  fossil	  fuel-­‐backed	  blocs	  of	  capital	  are	  only	  likely	  to	  heat	  up,	  with	  major	  ripples	  
through	  their	  competing	  production	  geographies	  and	  resource	  peripheries.	  In	  these	  fiercely	  
contested	  spaces,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  theorize	  green	  valuation,	  commodification,	  and	  various	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forms	  of	  surplus	  extraction	  without	  their	  corollaries—green	  devaluation,	  
decommodification,	  and	  disinvestment/destruction.	  These	  processes	  demand	  far	  more	  
theoretical	  development,	  empirical	  analysis,	  and	  public	  scholarship	  than	  they	  have	  received	  
to	  date.	  In	  many	  ways,	  they	  are	  analytically	  and	  politically	  useful.	  Schumpeterian	  disruptors	  
and	  their	  battles	  provide	  frank,	  if	  amoral,	  insights	  into	  contemporary	  capitalist	  practice—
something	  to	  which	  we	  are	  likely	  bound,	  uncomfortably,	  for	  a	  near-­‐term	  energy	  transition.	  
Simultaneously,	  they	  highlight	  its	  mindlessness	  and	  destructiveness.	  
	   Finally,	  critical	  scholars’	  role	  in	  these	  developing	  struggles	  requires	  more	  committed	  
deliberation,	  vital	  work	  that	  cannot	  come	  too	  soon.	  Certainly,	  both	  green	  and	  fossil	  
capitalism	  are	  likely	  to	  mean	  exploitation	  at	  the	  periphery	  (and	  at	  “home”);	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  
take	  on	  these	  fights.	  However,	  today’s	  competing	  capitalist	  visions	  are	  not	  simply	  identical	  
and	  interchangeable	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  destabilize	  and	  compromise	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  many,	  and	  
they	  leave	  us	  with	  very	  different	  material	  possibilities	  and	  socio-­‐technological	  bases	  to	  work	  
from.	  These	  divergences	  require	  more	  theoretical	  and	  political	  heavy	  lifting.	  Most	  
immediately,	  the	  alliances	  and	  tactics	  now	  being	  deployed	  in	  green	  economic	  development	  
demand	  engaged	  scholarship	  and	  political	  intervention.	  For	  one	  thing,	  cleantech	  may	  be,	  or	  
have	  been,	  usefully	  bloodthirsty	  in	  its	  assault	  on	  fossil	  fuels,	  but	  with	  many	  corresponding	  
flaws,	  as	  outlined	  here.	  Even	  if	  a	  resurgent	  cleantech	  exploits	  fossil	  fuel	  companies’	  new	  
weakness,	  its	  short	  attention	  span	  and	  inability	  to	  tolerate	  technological	  stability	  make	  it	  a	  
poor	  ally	  for	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  and	  just	  energy	  transition.	  Green	  Keynesianism	  and	  
industrial	  policy	  demand	  more	  serious	  consideration.	  In	  addition,	  even	  emerging	  critical	  
scholarship	  on	  fossil	  fuel	  divestment	  (Rowe	  et	  al.	  2016)	  has	  not	  questioned	  the	  movement’s	  
ready	  use	  of	  and	  alliance	  with	  global	  finance—ironic,	  in	  the	  ongoing	  aftermath	  of	  the	  
financial	  collapse.	  While	  tactical	  alliances	  for	  a	  particular	  fight	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed,	  
neither	  should	  a	  partner	  as	  unreliable—including	  in	  its	  climate	  change	  rhetoric	  (Johnson	  
2015)—as	  today’s	  financial	  industry	  pass	  without	  ongoing	  scrutiny	  and	  active	  political	  
discussion.	  As	  ample	  experience	  now	  demonstrates,	  unregulated	  green	  investment	  can	  be	  
not	  only	  exploitive	  but	  also	  ineffective.	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